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Fiscal councils and the quest for fiscal discipline
The budgetary footprint of the economic and finan-
cial crisis of 2008–09 brought to the fore renewed
concerns about governments’ commitment to sus-
tainable public finances, leaving financial markets
increasingly jittery. Indeed the crisis-related spike in
government debts came in addition to worrying up-
ward trends observed since the 1970s and before ra-
pidly intensifying demographic pressures on unfund-
ed entitlement spending have reached their peak.
While today’s debt levels are not unprecendented,
current dynamics are inconsistent with public sector
solvency, unless action is urgently taken (Figure 1).
Action certainly means ambitious, sustained and
probably painful consolidations combined with pro-
found entitlement reforms. However, with financial
markets on the watch and rapidly eroding credibility,
present governments also need to
anchor future fiscal policy in a
corridor of trajectories deemed
consistent with sustainable debt
dynamics.
For governments, committing to
operate within a range of socially
desirable policies is a perennial
challenge. As formally shown by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), time-inconsistency looms large be-
cause short-term considerations often lure policy-
makers into undesirable deviations from ex-ante
optimal strategies.The commitment problem is par-
ticularly severe for fiscal policy, as distributive con-
cerns – across groups and over time – complicate po-
licy formulation in ways that make excessive deficits
and debts irresistible. This problem is generally for-
mulated as the “common pool” theory of deficit bias
(Krogstrup and Wyplosz 2010). Other related causes
of deficit bias include politicians’ myopia resulting
from re-election concerns or a collective failure by
voters to appreciate the consequences of the inter-
temporal budget constraint for current policies. (For
a useful survey, see for instance Calmfors 2005).
Fiscal policy rules have long been used to contain
tendencies toward fiscal profligacy (e.g.,Fabrizio and
Mody 2006; Debrun et al. 2008).Yet the operational
limitations of rules undermine their own credibility,
as they have to be simple and are therefore likely to
be inadequate in a non-trivial set of “unusual” cir-
cumstances.This led some to argue that non-partisan
agencies could more effectively constrain fiscal dis-
cretion for the good of all. The institutional raw
model of the constrained-discretion regime is the
delegation of monetary policy instruments – not ob-
jectives – to independent central banks subject to a
well-defined mandate.
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However, there are fundamental differences be-
tween monetary and fiscal policies that preclude the
delegation of fiscal policy instruments to an inde-
pendent fiscal authority (IFA). The first argument
against delegation is normative: policy instruments
that have first-order distributive implications – as do
most fiscal levers – should stay in the hands of elect-
ed policymakers (Alesina and Tabellini 2007). Some
authors, although they do not dispute this general-
ization of the “no taxation without representation”
principle, have nevertheless argued that imposing
binding deficit limits to elected officials was a suffi-
ciently neutral task from a distributive standpoint to
be delegated to an IFA (Wyplosz 2005).This propo-
sition does not survive the second argument against
fiscal delegation, which is purely positive. To the
extent that the deficit bias is a feature of the ex-ante
political equilibrium, elected policymakers simply
have no incentive to delegate any policy-setting pre-
rogative to an IFA – nor to establish really binding
policy rules for that matter (Debrun 2011). Thirdly,
the greater variance of opinions about what consti-
tutes an appropriate fiscal policy in given circum-
stances (as opposed to monetary policy) would make
delegation even more difficult to establish and sus-
tain in practice.
If delegation or any form of binding constraint on
discretion is unlikely to be supported in a political
equilibrium, how can we establish a regime of “con-
strained discretion” for fiscal policy? The only credi-
ble option in a representative democracy is by
enabling the principal –i.e., voters – to hold politi-
cians accountable for implementing “sensible” poli-
cies (which is generally understood as stabilizing and
consistent with debt sustainability). Greater trans-
parency increases the visibility of deviations from
these policies and correspondingly raises the reputa-
tional costs of deviations. As a result, accountable
policymakers are less likely to misuse policy discre-
tion. Independent fiscal councils (FCs) can help by
improving the quality of the public debate on fiscal
policy. Formally, their effectiveness arises from their
ability to reduce the informational asymmetries that
provide fertile ground for the deficit bias. Only well-
informed voters can credibly sanction poor policies.
In practice, FCs can in particular:
(i) provide unbiased analyses of the likely econom-
ic and budgetary consequences of alternative
policy strategies with respect to ultimate societal
objectives (growth, employment, equity, stabili-
ty) and constraints (sustainability, possibly
expressed as numerical fiscal rules),
(ii) publish nonpartisan assessments of the extent to
which current and planned policies contribute to
achieve the government’s stated objectives,
(iii) enhance transparency through unbiased macro-
economic and budgetary forecasts,including the
costing of specific measures,
(iv) foster fiscal policy coordination among different
government entities (central administrations,
decentralized entities, social security, large pub-
lic enterprises benefitting from explicit or
implicit guarantees), and
(v) assess fiscal risks and propose risk-mitigating
strategies.
An effective fiscal council can take many forms.
Indeed, the sources and manifestations of the deficit
bias vary across countries so that the specific remit
of a council should only incorporate a subset of these
tasks, and many combinations are possible.Also, the
specific institutional form and modus operandi of a
fiscal council depends on elements of the political
system shaping the intereaction between voters and
elected policymakers (proportional vs. majoritarian
voting rule, presidential vs. parlementarian system,
centralized vs. decentralized state, transparency re-
quirements, etc.). The implied diversity of possible
FCs explains why despite a fairly active public de-
bate, no full-fledged theory has either established
the desirability of such institutions or derived first-
order principles likely to secure their effectiveness.1
Unsurprisingly, the literature on independent fiscal
agencies covers a wide array of specific (and some-
times outlandish) academic proposals as well as a
number of existing institutions. Although some pa-
pers propose a taxonomy (Debrun et al. 2009; Calm-
fors 2010), there is no consensus on the tasks these
agencies should be assigned, what institutional form
they should take, and on whether they should com-
plement or instead substitute for a rules-based
framework.
What qualifies as an independent Fiscal Council?
In principle, any non-partisan institution seeking to
actively inform and foster the quality of the public
debate on fiscal policy could qualify as a fiscal coun-
1 See Debrun (2011) for further discussion and Kopits (2011) for a
description of the emerging international best practice. The latter
emphasizes four pillars for FC effectiveness: political ownership of
the mandate and modus operandi, guarantees of operational inde-
pendence, adequate staffing, and a remit focused on a neutral
assessment of fiscal policy, the analysis of sustainability and the
promotion of transparency in budget preparation.cil. This includes specialized think tanks or research
institutes – e.g., the Institute for Fiscal Studies in the
United Kingdom,or the Austrian Institute of Econo-
mic Research (WIFO) – but also official bodies ex-
erting macroeconomic surveillance, such as the
OECD, the IMF and the European Commission.
In line with Debrun et al. (2009), our definition is
more restrictive. First, we exclude private bodies not
explicitly mandated by the government to perform
at least one of the tasks listed above.The existence of
an official mandate – and the related public funding
– is arguably a necessary condition for sufficiently
large reputational costs to materialize if govern-
ments deviate from their own commitments or fail to
deliver on announced objectives. Second, interna-
tional agencies are also excluded.Their surveillance
responsibilities are often too broad to generate the
kind of reputational costs a national body with a spe-
cific fiscal mandate can deliver; they lack the local
anchorage needed to effectively influence the na-
tional policy debate through continuous interaction
with policymakers and a deep understanding of po-
litical customs; and they are not expected to fully
internalize the objectives of the government in of-
fice. In sum, full ownership of the institution is nec-
essary for effectively shaping the national public
debate and fostering accountability, a point formally
illustrated by Debrun (2011) and emphasized by
Kopits (2011) as part of best practice. Finally, we do
not treat audit institutions as FCs. Although they
contribute to democratic accountability and trans-
parency,their approach is essentially backward-look-
ing and legalistic, as opposed to the primarily for-
ward-looking and economic work of FCs.
The issue of independence from politics is less clear-
cut. The notion of independence as it is used and
undertsood in the case of central banks calls for
explicit guarantees against any type of interference by
elected officials on the bank’s actions within the lim-
its of its mandate.While such guarantees are desirable
for fiscal councils as well, the absence of de jure inde-
pendence does not exclude considerable de facto au-
tonomy.Indeed,FCs,unlike central banks,are not ex-
pected to have actual decision-making responsibilities
or to be able to impose hard constraints on policy
choices,which reduces the immediate reward of regu-
lar interfering for the government.That said, de facto
independence is unlikely to survive repeated diver-
gences of views between elected officials and the FC,
especially if the latter has some direct leverage on the
conduct of fiscal policy through high-impact norma-
tive analysis and recommendations, or the provision
of forecasts.The experience with the High Council of
Finance (HCF) in Belgium is telling in that respect
(Coene and Langenus 2011).
In the remainder of this paper,we review key features
of actual (or in-the-making) institutions across conti-
nental Europe that have been (or can be) commonly
classified as fiscal councils. We identified 15 FCs in
12 countries (Belgium and Slovenia each have two
separate FCs, according to our definition). This in-
cludes the defunct Hungarian fiscal council and the
FC being created in Portugal. Other countries – for
instance Slovakia – are currently fairly advanced in
their reflection on the introduction of FCs.In our sur-
vey, we make a distinction between the “veterans”
and the new generation of councils.
Veterans vs. the new generation?
The veterans are relatively old institutions, the
“dean” being Belgium’s High Council of Finance,
created in 1936 to advise the Ministry of Finance.
The HCF has since then considerably evolved along
with the transition towards federalism in a context of
sustained fiscal consolidation. HCF’s new responsi-
bilities include recommending specific borrowing
limits for subnational entities consistent with Bel-
gium’s commitments under the EU convergence and
stability programs. Other veterans in our sample are
the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, Denmark’s
Economic Council, the German Council of Econo-
mic Experts, the Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis, and Slovenia’s Institute for Macro-
economic Analysis and Development. New institu-
tions have emerged since the late 1990s,starting with
the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council,Austria’s Govern-
ment Debt Committee – created in 1970, but which
received new responsibilities in 2002 – and more re-
cently, numerous Fiscal Councils in Central and
Eastern Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary,
Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia) and in Portugal.
A natural question is whether the new generation is
fundamentally different from the veterans.The design
of these institutions may have been influenced by the
intensifying academic debate on their potential role
in improving the conduct of fiscal policy (von Hagen
and Harden 1994; Eichengreen, Hausmann and von
Hagen 1999; Calmfors 2003; Fatàs et al. 2003; and
Wyplosz 2005 to cite the most prominent contribu-
tions) but also by the experience with setting up polit-
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ically independent agencies in other policy areas such
as central banking and various regulatory or supervi-
sory responsibilities. After screening publicly avail-
able information on fiscal councils (mainly the Euro-
pean Commission’s surveys of 2005 and 2009 on “fis-
cal institutions” and national sources), only a few no-
table differences emerge between the two groups.
Looking at the remit, all FCs under review are man-
dated to provide independent positive assessments of
fiscal policy (Figure 2). A majority of them are also
required to analyze long-term sustainability and eith-
er to assess the quality of macroeconomic and/or bud-
getary forecasts or to prepare such forecasts them-
selves. However, only Belgium, The Netherlands and
Slovenia generally (or are obliged to) use these fore-
casts for budget preparation.2 Interestingly, newer
institutions are less frequently involved in forecasting,
in part because they are often lean in terms of staffing
(see below). Checking compliance with national or
supranational fiscal policy rules is
a fairly common task assigned to
FCs on the European continent,
particularly among the new insti-
tutions,pointing to a growing per-
ception that rules and institutions
are complements rather than sub-
stitutes.3 This is in contrast with a
number of early papers advocat-
ing the introduction of FCs and
IFAs to replace ineffective rules
(e.g., Wyplosz 2005 and Fatàs et
al. 2003). Normative assessments
and policy recommendations are
only required from one half of all
councils (regardless of their age).
FCs are rarely involved in coor-
dinating budgets among govern-
ment entities. Finally, newly es-
tablished councils are more often
tasked to score specific measures
than older agencies, perhaps re-
flecting a greater awareness of the
importance of transparency in pol-
icymaking.
The channels through which councils can influence
fiscal performance vary widely, ranging from infor-
mal or technical advice to public communications
and formal procedures specifically aimed at magni-
fying the reputational and political costs of devia-
tions from ex-ante commitments.In line with theory,
relatively “soft” channels of influence – public re-
ports and analysis – clearly seem preferred to “hard-
er” channels whereby the council’s activity creates
an obligation for the government, such as public ex-
planations of policy slippages or biased forecasts,
and the possibility for the council to access elected
representatives through formal hearings in Parlia-
ment.The latter feature is more prominent in recent
councils, possibly to compensate for the lack of pre-
existing reputation and the correspondingly lower
visibility of (and lesser public trust in) their work.
Indeed, veteran councils generally enjoy significant
media impact which helps them influence the public






















































2 Jonung and Larch (2006) show that inde-
pendent forecasts reduce the risk of an
optimistic bias.
3 Numerical rules provide simple guide-
posts facilitating assessments by the FC.
Conversely, the existence of an FC may
help in the implementation of simple
numerical rules by providing an objective
evaluation of the causes for deviations
and eventually proposing options for
remedial actions.Still reflecting a revealed preference for soft influ-
ence, the new councils are rarely tasked to provide
binding forecasts for budget preparation – again a
reflection of their often parsimonious staffing – and
governments are in general not compelled to formal-
ly respond to the council’s assessments. Of course,
such an obligation need not be enshrined in law and
can emerge spontaneously,as the council’s work pro-
gressively gains traction in the public. It is important
to note that no FC is allowed to block the budget
process in case a draft budget violates objectives or
constraints the council is mandated to monitor.4
Turning to the degree of political and operational
independence, we looked at three dimensions: the
existence of legal guarantees similar to those in place
for central banks (e.g. long, non-renewable tenures
for the council’s management, prohibition of politi-
cal activities prior to the appointment, etc.), the ap-
pointment and retention of dedicated staff commen-
surate to the tasks of the council and secured multi-
year financing (Figure 4). The latter dimension is
particularly important because,unlike central banks,
FCs cannot generate significant own revenues. And
it is indeed through financial starvation that certain
governments – in Sweden and most egregiously in
Hungary – have attempted to curtail (or virtually
eliminate) their FC. Only a handful of FCs enjoys
some form of guaranteed financing, most likely a
manifestation of elected policymakers’ natural reluc-
tance to permanently cede too much influence on
the discretion to tax and spend.
Regarding the other dimensions of independence,
there appears to be a sharp contrast between the
veterans and the new generation. While the latter
rely more on legal safeguards, the former count on
the expertise and size of their staff to continue to
influence the budget debate. Of course, this styl-
ized fact is more a reflection of history than of an
ex-ante trade-off between adequate staffing and
legal guarantees of independence. Ideally, the two
should go hand in hand, as was the case for the
Hungarian FC.
A key question is whether certain combinations of
those features are more likely to improve fiscal per-
formance than others.Assessing the effectiveness of
FCs is clearly beyond the scope of this paper and
existing attempts are rather unconvincing. It is
indeed vexingly difficult to test the impact of FCs on
fiscal performance. Not only the small size of the
sample severely impedes a rigorous statistical analy-
sis, but the subtle and varied ways in which a fiscal
council can shape policy outcomes dramatically
complicates attempts to quantify its influence on the
conduct of fiscal policy.To end on a positive note,the
good news for researchers is that as more FCs are
likely to emerge, the universe of potentially interest-
ing case studies will expand significantly.
Conclusions
Fiscal councils have been a fairly old fixture of bud-
get institutions in some countries of continental Eu-
rope. While academic curiosity
and the recent policy debate on
ways to maintain or regain fiscal
credibility have revived interest
in them, the newcomers have lit-
tle to do with the independent fis-
cal authorities imagined in acade-
mic circles as a substitute for inef-
fective numerical fiscal rules.This
paper has presented descriptive
evidence that the newly estab-
lished councils are not radically
different from their ancestors, ex-
cept for the stronger legal anchor-
age (most notably in terms of for-
mal guarantees of independence),
a tendency to limit their size to a
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Legal guarantees on FC
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4 This was a feature of a first proposal of the Hungarian FC.
According to the proposal, the council would have had the right to
prevent – through a rubber-stamp ruling of the constitutional court
– that a draft budget deemed inconsistent with the overarching
principle of budget responsibility be tabled in parliament.CESifo DICE Report 3/2011 49
Forum
strict minimum and an explicit mandate to monitor
compliance with numerical fiscal rules.
Our discussion rejoins Kopits (2011) views on an
emerging best practice in setting up effective FCs:(i)
they should be fully owned by the local political
sphere in terms of their objectives and modus
operandi, (ii) they should have their own staff and
ring-fenced long-term resources, (iii) their manage-
ment should enjoy formal guarantees of indepen-
dence from elected officials, and (iv) their remit
should be strictly limited to informing budget prepa-
ration and fiscal policy formulation. Looking for-
ward,limited resources available to create new insti-
tutions could be a constraint on FCs operational in-
dependence and effectiveness, especially if the cor-
responding appropriations are not adequately ring-
fenced or if extra-budgetary resources (e.g., a claim
on central bank’s seigniorage) are not available.
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